Deception in multi-attacker security game with nonfuzzy and fuzzy payoffs

Abstract

There is significant interest in studying security games for defense optimization and reducing the effects of attacks on various security systems involving vital infrastructures, financial systems, security, and urban safeguarding centers. Game theory can be used as a mathematical tool to maximize the effciency of limited security resources. In a game, players are smart, and it is natural for each player (defender or attacker) to try to deceive the opponent using various strategies in order to increase his payoff. Defenders can use deception as an effective means of enhancing security protection by giving incorrect information, hiding specific security resources, or using fake resources. However, despite the importance of deception in security issues, there is no considerable research on this field, and most of the works focus on deception in cyber environments. In this paper, a mixed-integer linear programming problem is proposed to allocate forces effciently in a security game with multiple attackers using game theory analysis. The important subjects of information are their credibility and reliability. Especially when the defender uses deceptive defense forces, there are more ambiguity and uncertainty. Security game with Z-number payoffs is considered to apply both ambiguities in the payoffs and the reliability of earning these payoffs. Finally, the proposed method is illustrated by some numerical examples.