The comparison of the role of social obligations and the dignity of conversation in the formation of meaning in Wittgenstein, John Hick, Alston, and Searle's perspective

Abstract

Some scholars regard the language of religion to be different from conventional one (or the language of science). Hence, they consider the cause of several problems and complexities of understanding religion in the lack of the correct understanding of this language. Considering the breadth of views on the language of religion, this research explores only four of them (Wittgenstein, John Hick, Austin, and Searle). The interface of these four views is the idea that meaning is somehow reduced to function in the language of religion. Nevertheless, John Hick adheres to this postulate to a limited degree. Tow methodological factors will be compared in these perspectives: the role of social obligations in the formation of meaning and the dignity of conversation or levels of understanding. The purpose of this study is to obtain a methodological model with a descriptive, analytical method of comparative comparison of these views based on four factors. The conclusion of the research shows that social commitments and dignity of conversation are effective in the creation of meaning in the Wittgenstein's model. John Hick and Alston seem to have involved the dignity of conversation in his model. In Searle's model of meaning, the word implies meaning based on social convention in the other hand social obligations are clearly prominent in the creation of meaning.